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RELIGIOUS CLAUSES OF THE FIRST
A~~~~~ M MENAMENDMENT, .
FOWLER HARPER
A number of cases were decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the late thirties and early fourties which involved
the First Amendment's guarantee of the free practice of religion.
Most of these cases involved members of the sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses. Three such cases upholding legislation requiring licenses
for the street distribution of literature were decided by the Court on
June 8, 1942. The decision was five to four, the majority consisting
of Justices Reed, Roberts, Jackson, Frankfurter and Byrnes.
Shortly after these cases were thus decided, Justice Byrnes
resigned to accept the position of Director of War Mobilization.
President Roosevelt nominated Justice Rutledge to fill the vacancy
on January 11, 1943. He was confirmed by the United States
Senate on February 8th, and took the oath an his seat on the Court
on February 15th. In the meantime the Court ordered reargu-
ment of the Jehovah's Witnesses cases which took place on March
10th and l1th. The earlier decision was reversed the following May.
This essay deals with the participation of Justice Rutledge in those
cases, who joined the previous four dissenters to swing the Court
the other way by another five to four vote.
"Ye Are My Witnesses"
The religions of the world have been organized in many forms
and their faiths reflected in numerous creeds. It is probably not too
much to say that all societies in all ages have had some more or less
systematic way of explaining life's mysteries which could be called
religion. This is, indeed, a believing world. Western Europe and
the Americas have for centuries been religiously dominated by
Christianity with slight Judaic overtones. Catholics and Protestants
compete for ascendency in the various nations, the former more
* The material in this article will constitute a chapter in a forthcoming
book on justice Rutledge to be published by the Bobbs-Merril Company.
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numerous in South America and Southern Europe, the latter pre-
dominating with minor exceptions, elsewhere.
Protestantism is divided into a dozen or more major denomina-
tions, with minor offshoots, differing on lesser matters of discipline,
ceremony and faith. In addition, it has from time to time, been
plagued with small crackpot sects or movements, some merely fa-
natically motivated, others originating from political and financial
considerations, with varying degrees of moral and intellectual dishon-
esty in their leaders. But as Justice Jackson pointed out in the "I Am"
cult case, "The chief wrong which false prophets do to their follow-
ing is not financial;*** The real harm is on the mental and spiritual:
plane. There are those who hunger and thirst after higher values
which they feel -wanting in their humdrum lives. They live in mental
confusion or moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty
and moral support. When they are deluded and then disillusioned,
cynicism and confusion follow. ***But that is precisely the thing
the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the
price of freedom of religion or of speech or of the press is that we
must put up with, and even pay for, a good deal of rubbish." 1 In
one of the most sensitive areas of human thought, where tolerance
is least to be found, this is strong doctrine. But so far as the law is
concerned, it "knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of
no dogma, the establishment of no sect." 2
Jehovah's Witnesses is a fanatical, fundamentalist religious or-
ganization founded in 1872 by a man named Charles Taze Russell
of Pennsylvania. It seems that at first this was an informal group
which gathered together to study the scriptures. Apparently they
became fascinated with the idea of the second coming of Christ and
the end of the world. Some years later the group incorporated and
established headquarters in Brooklyn, New York. The movement
grew and expanded. "Since 1938, with the adoption of a Theocratic
organization extending all the way down to the congregational level,
Jehovah's Witnesses have made their most amazing increase. In the
ten years following that date new ministers were being baptized and
entering the field at the rate of a thousand a week." I Today the
organization. carries on its programs in England, Europe and other
I United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78, 94-95 (1944), dissenting opinion.
.2 Justice Miller, in Watson v. Jones" 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871).
3 Cole, Jehovah's Witnessess 106 (1955).
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parts of the world. It is essentially an evangelical organization,
"preaching" the "word" in the streets and engaging in door to door
canvassing to sell or give away the numerous tracts and pamphlets
put out by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, its Pennsylvania
corporate publishing house.
Little is known of the finances of the society. Presumably most
of its revenues are derived from sales of its literature and the con-
tributions of its members, who, although for the most part of small
income, are of great faith and devotion. The Society has acquired
some real estate over the years and several radio stations, but as
income producers these are probably of comparatively little value.
In addition to literature, the Society has used portable phono-
graphs extensively in its recruiting and proselyting activities. It
also manufactures records for sale as well as for street use. From
time to time it uses sound trucks with amplifiers sufficient to reach
audiences of considerable size.
The bulk of its evangelistic activities is caried on by the rank
and file who carry the message, personally, to the public. The
words of Isaiah (43:10) are taken literally and personally: "Ye are
my Witnesses." These colporteurs consist of men, women and children
"thoroughly consecreated to the program and eager to sacrifice every-
thing, if necessary, for the work to which they believe Jehovah has
called them." 4 This work is not carried out on a hit or miss basis.
It is carefully organized, the preachers being assigned to definite
areas by direction of a local central organization.
The Witnesses who work in the streets were. originally called
"Pioneers." Stroup writing in 1945, reported that the Pioneers re-
ceived full maintenance (room, board and clothing), travel expenses
and ten dollars a month as an allowance-"the same as any full-
time worker in the Brooklyn factory or on the farms. Missionaries
sent abroad by the Society work on the same basis as do the Pioneers
at home." 5
The Watchtower'for January 1, 1962, contains a summary of
the widespread activities of this group. It reports that the average
number of "publishers," that is, colporteurs who devote a substantial
amount of their time to "preaching" on the streets and public places
for the United States was 248,681. The total pieces of literature
4 Stroup, Ihe Jehovah's Witnesses 61 (1945)..
s Ibid., 62.
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distributed annually was 6.240,290 in 37.232,858 hours of canvas-
sing. It also disclosed activities, varying in numbers and extent, in
175 different countries as divergent as the Islands of Tobago, Taiwan,
the Azores and Iceland on the one hand, and the Argentine, Sudan,
China, India, Pakistan, France, Great Britain and Sweden. The
grand total of "publishers" all over the world came to 851,378.
That this sect is still active and growing in the United States is
evidenced by the fact that in July, 1963, in a single ceremony, 2,251
converts were baptized at Orchard Beach in the Bronx. (New York
Times, July 13, 1963).
Persecution of the witnesses in small cities and towns in the
United States was nothing new to them. Their fanatical attacks upon
Catholicism had brought them many violent reprisals in Italy and
other European countries. With the advent of the Hitler dictatorship
in 1933, their troubles in Germany increased. Their property was
seized, their printing plant closed, their meetings and activities
forced underground.6 As might be expected, the Witnesses fared no
better under Communist rule. They report in Jehovah's Witnesses in
the Divine Purpose: "The expansion in Europe following World
War II was not accomplished without great difficulties. This was
especially true in those countries where Communist influence was
strongly felt. As Russia gradually lowered the Iron Curtain in Europe
after 1948, thousands of Witnesses found themselves subjected to
persecution, in many ways, worse than that which they had ex-
perienced under Nazi rule. After only three or four years of freedom
from concentration camps, thousands again found themselves forced
back into such devilish institutions or were sent to work as slaves in
Russian mines, or, worse still, were banished to Siberia... In 1948,
there were 440 still in prison." 7
In 1941, the American Civil Liberties Union published a pam-
phlet outlining the troubles of violence suffered by the Witnesses in
the United States. Not since the persecution of the Mormons, it
noted, had any religious minority been subjected to such lawless
attacks by irresponsible mobs. The worst outbreak occurred after
the 1940 ,decision in the Gobitis case8 in which the Supreme Court
6 Qualified to be Ministers 324 (an official tract of the Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society, 1942).
7 277-278 (1945).
8 Minorsville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U. S. 586 (1940).
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upheld the compulsory flag-salute regulation of a local school board.
The Gobitis children had refused to comply because of their cons-
cientious objections and those of their parents.
Most of the attacks were made on helpless house-to-house can-
vassers in small communities. Legionnaires and other self-proclaimed
"patriots" insisted that they "salute" the flag. Men and women
were beaten, jailed and chased out of town. Instance after instance
was recorded of shameless and cowardly assaults with police protec-
tion refused. Their literature was seized and destroyed repeatedly
and their property damaged. In few cases were attorneys for the
Witnesses able to obtain warrants for the arrest of members of the
mob whom they had positively identified. The situation became so
scandalous that in June, 1940, Attorney General Biddle addressed
the nation on a radio network. "A religious sect known as Jehovah's
Witnesses," he said, "have been repeatedly set upon and beaten. They
had committed no crime; but the mob adjudged they had, and meted
out punishments H* We shall not defeat the Nazi evil by emulating
its methods." 9
At about this time a series of cases, eventually to reach the
Supreme Court, were in the making, challenging official restrictions
on the behavior of members of the Society. The Court had already
decided three cases"' involving basically the same issue but there
was dissension and conflict ahead.
In one, Lovell v. Griffin a unanimous Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Hughes, held void a sweeping ordinance which re-
quired a license to distribute any kind of literature. The City Manager
was given authority to grant such licenses in his discretion. Although
the convicted Witness had been distributing religious pamphlets,
the case was decided solely on the freedom of the press issue. This
was in March, 1938.
Mr. Justice Roberts delivered the opinion in the Schneider
case in November 1939. Only Justice McReynolds dissented. Again
the decision turned on freedom of the press rather than religion.
Ordinances of several cities were involved, either prohibiting pam-
phlet distribution on the streets or requiring a permit from the
police. All were struck down, the Court holding that neither the
9 The Persecution of Jehovah's Witnessess 22 (1941).
10 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938); Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U. S. 147 (1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut,. 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
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purpose of keeping the streets clean nor the prevention of fraudulent
advertising was sufficient to justify invasion of the privilege of
freedom of the press. There are other obvious methods of protection
against such evils which are reasonable and less restrictive. The
Cartwell case, decided the following May (1940), involved both
freedom of speech and religion. Justice Roberts again speaking for
the Court, held invalid a Connecticut statute requiring the approval
of a state official for any religious or philanthropic cause as a con-
dition to the solicitation of money from persons other than members
of the soliciting organization.
On February 15th, 1943, the New York Times had carried a
news story, in part as follows: "Wiley Blount Rutledge, Jr. was
sworn in today as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and
within half an hour the Court issued two unexpected orders aimed
at speedy disposition of important cases affecting civil liberties" 11
"One order, rare in the tribunal's history, granted rearguments
in three cases in which the Court decided 5 to 4 last June that
Jehovah's Witnesses must obey city ordinances prohibiting distribu-
tion of literature without a license.** *
"Some observers who have followed the cases of Jehovah's
Witnesses in the Supreme Court believe that with Justice Rutledge
upon the bench, the Jurists may now reverse themselves not only
in the literature-peddling cases, but also in the Gobitis decision of
three years ago that school children of that sect must salute the
American flag regardless of religious convictions."
The previous June the Court had upheld city ordinances of
cities in Alabama, Arkansas and Arizona imposing license taxes on
the sale of printed matter, as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses' itine-
rant street evangelists.12 The case is commonly referred to as the
Opelika case. The ordinances had been attacked as in violation of
the free speech and press provisions as well as the free practice of
religion clause of the First Amendment made applicable to the
state through the Fourteenth Amendment. The decision was five to
four, Chief Justice Stone and Justices Black, Douglas and Murphy
dissenting. As reported in the Times, rehearing was ordered on the
day Rutledge took his seat on the Court. After argument, the deci-
sion was reversed on the same day that the Court handed down
11 The Times, February 15, under the by-line of Thomas Wood.
12 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584 (1942).
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decisions in three other related cases involving activities of :this
particular sect. Rutledge, of course, cast the deciding vote. The
remaining four Justices of the former majority dissented.1 3
It is almost impossible to find a rational explanation for the
series of Supreme Court decisions involving the Witnesses during
these years. To be sure there were slight differences in the city
ordinances involved in these various cases, but it is hard, indeed,
to find constitutional distinctions. Nor does the changing personnel
of the Court clarify things until the Rutledge appointment and the
second Opelika decision. In the 1938 case, Justice Cardozo took no
part because of illness but he no doubt would have joined in the
opinion of Chief Justice Hughes, as did the other seven Justices, in
invalidating the city law. In 1939 Justice McReynolds was' a lone
dissenter in the Schneider case. Justices Frankfurter and Douglas,
who had replaced Justices Cardozo and Brandeis, joined the four
other Justices in supporting Roberts' opinion that the ordinance in-
volved was unconstitutional. Justice Butler had died a week before
and had not participated in the judgment. In the Connecticut case,
Justice Murphy had taken Butler's seat and the decision was again
unanimous. Within two weeks after this decision came the first flag
salute case. A law requiring children of the Witnesses to salute the
flag in public schools was upheld by the same Court, Stone being
the only dissenter. Two years later, with Byrnes filling Stone's place
when the latter succeeded Hughes as Chief Justice, the first Opelika
decision came down, upholding the license ordinance by a five to
four vote.
There is much to be explained. How did Justice McReynolds
come to hold unconstitutional the ordinances in the Lovell and Con-
necticut cases? He failed to explain his dissent in the Schneider
case. Indeed he said nothing in any of these cases.- Why did Butler
so vote in Lovell? How to explain Frankfurter's votes in the Schnei-
der case and his contrary vote in both Opelikas not to mention the
flag salute case? Finally, who would have supposed that Douglas
and Black would have upheld the flag salute law? Stone's position
throughout this series of cases appears to be the only consistent one
of the various Justices involved.
The original Opelika opinion had been written by Justice Reed.
13 Jones v. Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 (1943).
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The city ordinance had required a ten dollar yearly license fee for
book agents and a five dollar fee for transient agents or distributors.
The licenses were subject to revocation in the discretion of the
licensing commission, with or without notice. The two other cases,
-decided at the same time, involved slightly different license require-
ments or city ordinances. Appellants, convicted for non-compliance,
relied both on the free press and freedom of religion clauses of the
First Amendment. Reed's opinion pointed out the difference between
"'censorship and complete prohibition" on the one hand, and "regula-
tion of the conduct of individuals in the time, manner and place of
their activities." He placed emphasis upon the fact that since the
-appellants' evangelism was also used as a source of funds, "the fi-
nancial* aspects of their transactions need not wholly be disregarded.
To subject any religious or didactic group to a reasonable fee for
their money-making activities does not require a finding that the
licensed acts are purely commercial.' If we were to assume, as is
here argued, that the licensed activities involve religious rites, a
different question would be presented. These are not taxes on free
-will offerings. But it is because we view these sales as partaking
more of commercial than religious or educational transactions that
we find the ordinances, as here presented, valid." Stone's dissent
was powerful. He started with Lovell v. Gri]ittA14 in which a unani-
mous Court had.held void on its face the requirement of a license
for the distribution of pamphlets to be issued in the sole discretion
of an administrative officer. 'That purpose (freedom from previous
restraint upon publication) cannot rightly be defeated by so trans-
parent a subterfuge as the pronouncement that, while a license may
not be required if its award is contingent upon the whim of an ad-
ministrative officer, it may be if its retention and the enjoyment
of the privilege which it purports to give are wholly contingent on
hiis whim." He then blasted the argument that the ordinances merely
regulated the "time, place and manner" of appellant's activities.
"None of the Ordinances, if complied with," he wrote, "purports to
or could, control the time, place or manner of the distribution of
the books and pamphlets'concerned. None has any discernible rela-
tionship to the police protection or the good order of the community.
The only condition and purpose of the licenses * * is suppression of
14 303 U. S. 444.
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,the specified distributions of literature in default of the payment of
a substantial tax fixed in amount and measured neither by the extent
'of the defendants' activities under the license nor the amounts which
'they receive for and devote to religious purposes in the exercise of
the licensed privilege." He thought that if such taxes as those in-
'volved in the three cases before them were sustained, the way was
open for the effective suppression of speech, press and religion. "In
its potency," he concluded, "as a prior restraint on publication, the
flat license tax falls short only of outright censorship or suppres-
sion."
Another case (Murdock v. PennsylvanLa),15 decided the same
,day as the second Opelika decision, invalidated a city ordinance
requiring a license for which the licensee paid a reasonable fee to
canvass, take orders or deliver any merchandise within the city.
'Several Witnesses had been arrested for non-compliance. The opinion
of the Colit was rendered by Justice Douglas, with the same dis-
• senters as in Opelika. He pointed out that the cases involved no un-
'lawful act during the solicitation, nor any question of registration of
,solicitors. "The cases present a single issue," he wrote, "the cons-
titutionality of an ordinance which as construed and applied requires
religious colporteurs to pay a license tax as a condition to the pursuit
. of their activities." The activity of the Witnesses "is more than
preaching; it is more than the distribution of religious literature.
It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the
'revival meeting."
He distinguished the situation before the Court from one in-
wolving purely commercial activities. The mere fact that the col-
porteurs "sold" or gave away their literature did not make it a
'business enterprise. "If it did, then the passing of the collection
'plate in church would make the church service a commercial project.
'The constitutional rights of those spreading their religious beliefs
'through the spoken and printed word are not to be gauged by
-standards governing retailers or wholesalers of books." Douglas ham-
mered away at his theme: "An itinerent evangelist, however, mis-
-guided or intolerant he may be, does not become a mere book agent
'by selling the Bible or religious tracts to help defray his expenses
or to sustain him. Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom
15 319 U. S. 105 (1943).
REVISTA JURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO lIZ,')
of religion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay
their own way."
In his dissent, Justice Reed insisted upon the right of the states
to tax publishing houses and religious organizations. "It may be-
concluded," he wrote, "that neither in the state or the federal cons,
titutions was general taxation of church or press interdicted. Is
there anything in the decisions of this Court which indicates that
Church or press is free from the financial burdens of government?'
We find nothing." 16 To which Douglas answered:
"We do not mean to say that religious groups and the press-
are free from all financial burdens of government. ***We' have here
something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income-
of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used
or employed in connection with those activities. It is one thing to,
impose a tax on the income or property of a preacher. It is quite
another thing to exact a tax from him for the privilege of delivering
a sermon. The tax imposed by the City of Jeannette is a flat license
tax, the payment of which is a condition of the exercise of these,
constitutional privileges. The power to tax the exercise of a privilege
is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. Those who can%
tax the exercise of this religious practice can make its exercise so,
costly as to deprive it of the resources necessary for its maintenance..
Those who can tax the privilege of engaging in this form of mis-
sionary evangelism can close its doors to all those who do not have'
a full purse. Spreading religious beliefs in this ancient and honorable,
manner would thus be denied the needy.' Those who can deprive
religious groups of their colporteurs can take from them a part of'
the vital power of the press which has survived from the Reforma--
tion." 17
Here, -Douglas may' have pushed a good argument too far. As
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent pointed out, "the power to tax
is the power to destroy only in the sense that those who have power
can misuse it." He then quoted Justice Holmes, as disposing of'
this "smooth phrase," when he added not "while this Court sits."'
But Holmes' dictum in this context may also be too "smooth." The
real issue is when, if ever, may a state impose a tax on the exercise'
of a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United'States?
16 319 U. S. 105, 127-128.
17 Ibid., 112.
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. A third case decided the same day as the Opelika decision in-
volved a municipal ordinance of the Ohio town of Struthers 8 which
made it unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or
advertisements, to ring doorbells, sound doorknockers or otherwise
summon householders to the door to receive them. The ordinance
was held unconstitutional by the usual five to four decision. Mr.
Justice Black wrote for the Court. Mr. Justice Murphy wrote a
concurring opinion in which Justice Rutledge and Douglas joined.
Justice Rutledge's file on this case discloses a curious sequence
of events. The original vote had been for upholding the ordinance.
Black, Jackson, Roberts, Frankfurter and Reed constituting the ma-
jority, with Stone, Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge dissenting. Black
was to write the opinion for the Court. Black wrote his opinion and
circulated it. His position, briefly, was as follows: While the Cons-
titution assures to everyone the right to believe and worship in ac-
cordance with his individual conscience, it does not grant an un-
restrained liberty to engage, even in the name of religion, in conduct
which may seriously jeopardize the rights of others. Religious liberty
is not a license to interfere in the affairs of another who does not
share his beliefs. There was evidence that Struthers was an industrial
community near Youngstown where the iron and steel mills operated
swing shifts around the clock. This meant that many workers slept
in the daytime. Black thought that callers selling pots and pans or
distributing leaflets could interfere with the peaceful enjoyment of
a home as much as a neighborhood glue factory or a railroad yard.
The rubric "a man's home is his castle" is no mere rhetorical phrase.
At this point both Stone and Rutledge wrote and circulated dis-
senting opinions. The Rutledge draft pointed out that the record was
meager as to the extent of swing shifts and the number of night
workers. "Neither common knowledge nor unsupported assertions of
counsel can supply foundation in fact for belief that handbill dis-
tributors are more disturbing than others." He denounced the law
as altogether arbitrary. The ordinance, as written, includes everyone
who knocks or rings the bell with paper in hand and itends to give
it to the occupant. It excludes all who come without the circular.
The prohibition is not confined to the nuisance who rings pesti-
ferously or persistently. "One knock is enough." The thrust of this
18 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. ,. 141 (1943).
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opinion was the discriminatory character of the ordinance although
it also pointed out that the law was broad enough to exclude circular
distributors who were welcome to the householder and thus to usurp,
the owner's "right to control his property."
Stonc's opinion made somewhat the same point as Rutledge's..
Further, he could not accept a decision which could open the way to,
complete suppression in every town and city in the land, of all per-
sonal communication of ideas by a stranger to the people in their-
homes, however willing they might 'be to receive them. Such ordi-
nances would have stamped out the form of evangelism-to say noth--
ing of political appeals by handbills and pamphlets-which has been
the historic means of communicating ideas to people in their homes,.
both in Europe and in the United States. He pointed out that a
community which today, if moved to do so, could by the use of this.
device suppress the house-to-house communication of ideas and so-
licitations of funds by Jehovah's Witnesses, could in other days have
similarly suppressed the collection of funds and the dissemination of
ideas in the support of Protestantism and Catholicism and many,
another faith now accepted and cherished by millions. If only ac-
cepted causes, which no longer need the house-to-house appeal, are
entitled to enjoy the benefits of the First Amendment, he thought,
its guarantees serve little purpose and could as well not have beer
written.
Neither Black's opinion referred to above nor Stone's and Rut-
ledge's was ever published. Black switched his vote to join the dis-
senters who then constituted the majority to invalidate the ordinance.
He then wrote the opinion for the Court as it eventually appeared.
Stone was content with the reasons expressed therein while Rutledge-
joined in a concurring opinion by Murphy. Reed wrote a dissenting
opinion in which Roberts and Jackson joined, Frankfurter wrote a
short opinion which he neither characterized as "concurring or dis-
senting."
The last of the May 3rd Jehovah's Witnesses cases was Douglas v.
Jeannette," in which the Court held an injunction not available to
prohibit City officials from enforcing an ordinance requiring a li-
cense, for which a tax must be paid, to solicit orders for any kind'
of merchandise. It was the usual manifestation of the reluctance Of
19 319 U. S. 157 (1943).
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the federal courts to interfere with or embarrass proceedings in
state courts except to prevent irreparable and imminent injury. There
was no reason to believe that the complainants were threatened with
injury other than that incidental to any criminal prosecution brought
in good faith. Adequate relief, if their claims were justified, would
be available by resort to normal appellate procedure, i. e., if con-
victed, they ,could appeal through the state courts to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The Prince case,20 decided the following term of Court involved
the validity of the Massachusetts Child Labor Law as applied to a
nine-year old Jehovah's Witness girl selling or offering for sale
religious literature on the streets of Brockton. The law forbade boys
under twelve and girls under eighteen to "sell, expose or offer for
sale any newspapers, magazines, periodicals or any other articles of
merchandise of any description, or exercise the trade of bootblack,",
etc. on the streets.
The girl, accompanied by her aunt had violated this statute,
making the usual claim that this was a part of a religious duty, to,
woship God and "engage in preaching work." The aunt, Mrs.
Prince, was prosecuted and convicted under the provision of the law
which made parents or guardians violators by compelling or permit-
ting violation by under-age children. Against her First Amendment
plea, the State court affirmed her conviction. "We think that freedom
of the press and religion," the court said, "is subject to incidental'
regulation to the slight degree involved in the prohibition of selling
of religious literature in streets and public places by boys under
twelve and girls under eighteen and in the further statutory pro-
visions herein considered, which have been adopted as means of
enforcing that prohibition." 21
Rutledge, writing for the Court, affirmed the State court in up-
holding the law. Actually the only point in issue was the free-practice-
of-religion clause. Appellant did not stand on freedom of speech or
press. She conceded that Massachusetts might regulate the distribu-
tion of secular literature by these means, but not religious matter.
She also sought to buttress her position with a claim of parental,
right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But as Rutledge pointed out, in the circumstances of the case before
20 Prince V. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944).
21 Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223, 229 (1943).
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the Court, "all that is comprehended in the former (due process) is
included in the latter (freedom of religion)."
"It is in the interest of youth itself," wrote Rutledge, "and of
the whole community, that children be both safeguarded from abuses
and given opportunities for growth into free and independent well-
developed men and citizens." And, he added, "neither rights of
religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation. Acting to
guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens
patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school atten-
dance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other
ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds
his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or
conscience." 22
It was conceded by the opinion that a statute identical in terms
would be invalid as applied to adults. "The state's authority over
childrens' activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This
is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment.
"*It is true children have rights, in common with older people,
in the primary use of highways. ***Street preaching, whether oral
or by handing out literature, is not the primary use of the highway,
even for adults. While for them it cannot be wholly prohibited, it
can be regulated within reasonable limits in accommodation to the
primary and other incidental uses." While the presence of parent or
guardian might protect the child against some street risks, it could
not forestall all of them. Zealously propagandizing the community
in public places, Rutledge thought, whether politically or religiously,
creates situations difficult for adults, much more so for children in-
cluding emotional excitement and psychological as well as physical
harm. "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it
does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make
martyrs of their children..." 23
But, the appellant argued, for Jehovah's Witnesses and their
children the streets were their church, and to deny them access for
religious purposes is on the level with the exclusion of altar boys,
choir boys and other children from their places of worship. To this,
Rutledge replied that "the public highways have not become their
religious property merely by their assertion. And there is no denial
321 U. S. 158, 165-166.
23 Ibid., 168-170.
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of equal protection in excluding their children from doing there
what no other children may do."
In one of the relatively few cases involving First Amendment
issues, Justice Murphy here found himself in disagreement with
Rutledge. The Justice's papers disclose traces of kindly but serious
badinage on the issue in which eight members of the Court were in
agreement on a highly controversial issue. "Frank wants the solitary
glory of dissent," wrote one of the Justices to Rutledge. In a scrib-
bled note, Frankfurter explained why he had left the conference on
this case. He had to see an old friend who had a personal problem
"'and so could not enter into talk when you began to say some
joshing thing to me. I came later to listen to you at length and to
rejosh, if I could."
"Solitary glory" or not, Murphy's opinion was a strong one,
both from the heart and the mind. After the circulation of Rutledge's
draft opinion, he, too, in a penciled note, wrote: 'Wiley-I am never
happy disagreeing with you. And there is so little I can contribute
here but I am a profound if not an adequate Jeffersonian on freedom
of conscience. So I will write a note-inoffensive I'm sure-in the
Prince case when it comes down."
In fact, although his "note" was inoffensive as they invariably
were, Murphy made points which Rutledge did not answer to the
satisfaction of many "profound," if not "adequate Jeffersonians."
Relying on the "preferred position" of First Amendment rights,
Murphy pointed out that "we are not aided by any strong presump-
tion of the constitutionality of such legislation. On the contrary, the
human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and carried
over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be in-
vulnerable and any attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima
facie invalid... The burden was therefore on the state of Massa-
chusetts to prove the reasonableness and necessity of prohibiting
children from engaging in religious activity of the type involved in
this case. The burden in this instance, however, is not met by vague
references to the reasonableness underlying child labor legislation in
general... The vital freedom or religion cannot be erased by slender
references to the state's power to restrict the more secular activities
of children."
It can hardly be denied that the facts, as revealed in the Court's
opinion, indicate little more than "slender references" to the state's
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power to protect children from the evils of activities in the streets.
During oral argument it appears that the Chief Justice had made
some remark to the effect that the Court would take judicial notice
of street dangers to children. Council for the Witnesses later wrote a
letter asking the Court to take judicial notice of a study by the
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company concluding that "the home is
relatively more dangerous than the public sidewalks." Nevertheless,
to many readers and critics who may be as "profound," and perhaps,
more "adequate Jeffersonians," the decision may appear to be a com-
mon sense, pragmatic accommodation of the power of the state, as
parens pairia to the right of the free practice of religion in a situa-
tion created by a fanatical, though consecrated minority.
The Court's position and Murphy's position in this case are
perfectly clear regardless of one's point of view as to the merits. But
there was another opinion-characterized as "separate," by Justice
Jackson. He had joined in Frankfurter's dissent in Murdock v. Pen-
nsylvania. In his Prince opinion, he dissented from Murdock all over
again. It is in fact a concurrence. "I have no alternative," he said,
"but to dissent from the grounds of affirmance of a judgment which
I think was rightly decided, and upon right grounds, by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts."
It is not too clear just what it was that troubled Jackson. Ap-
parently, it was the accent on youth of the Rutledge position. He
quoted from Douglas' Murdock opinion that the street evangelism
of the Witnesses occupies the same high estate under the. First
Amendment as does "worship in the churches and preaching from
the pulpits" and stressed the Court's refusal to regard it as a com-
mercial enterprise. In some curious way, he then arrived at the non-
sequitur that "if the Murdock doctrine stands along with today's
decision, a foundation is laid for any state intervention in the in-
doctrination and participation of children in religion, provided it is
done in the name of their health or welfare." 24
After the circulation among the Justices of this opinion, Rutledge
received a scribbled complaint from the irked Douglas, suggesting
that Jackson's point be somehow met. The result was the addition of
the final paragraph of the opinion, to which Douglas agreed, as
follows:
a4 Ibid., 177.
JUSIICE RUTLEDGE AND THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES...
"Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents.
We neither lay the foundation 'for any (that is, every) state in-
tervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in
religion' which may be done 'in the name of their health and welfare'
nor give warrant for 'every limitation on their religious training and
activities.' The religious training and indoctrination of children may
be accomplished in many ways, some of which, as we have noted,
have received constitutional protection through decisions of this
Court. These and all others except the public proclaiming of religion
on the streets, in so far as this may be taken as either training or
indoctrination of the proclaimer, remain unaffected by the deci-
sion." 25
Two days before opinion day Rutledge received a note from
Frankfurter to the effect that he wished to withdraw his previously
indicated concurrence with the Court's opinion. Since the Jackson
opinion was based on approval of the grounds taken by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and sice he thought those were
the right grounds, he had decided to join Jackson. Roberts had
already indicated that he would concur with the Jackson opinion.
Both Justices had dissented in Mu rdock.
The opinion of the Massachusetts court was mostly devoted to
an interpretation of the provisions of the child labor law and the
question of self-incrimination involved when appellant refused to
give the child's name to the school attendance office for which she
was convicted on the first count of the indictment. Scarcely more
than a page of the opinion dealt with the First Amendment constitu-
tional issue. The grounds for decision on the point may be summed
up in one sentence. 'These provisions belong to a type of legislation
long regarded as within the duty of the State to protect the health,
morals, and welfare of its people." 26 When Justice Black returned
the Rutledge draft with his approval, he added he liked its "clarity,
force and brevity." It is not obvious that the opinion of the Massachu-
setts Court was superior in any of these respects, unless it was
"brevity."
It appears that a majority of the Court had originally favored
dismissal of the appeal for want of a substantial federal question and
25 Ibid., 171.
26 313 Mass. 223, 228-229.
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*a typewritten "Per Curiam" memorandum to that effect was circulat-
ed. Murphy, who dissented, and Jackson who had his axe to grind
over Murdock, circulated memoranda urging that the appeal be
granted. Jackson's argument was substantially that which appeared
in his "separate" opinion.
Rutledge worked hard on his opinion and was, as always, open
to criticism and suggestions from his brethren although he did not,
of course, invariably follow them. Sometimes, however, he made too
many concessions. For example, he accepted a suggestion from the
Chief Justice which actually weakened his Prince opinion. The draft
of the opinion as originally circulated, contained the following:
"The fallacy of the (appellants) argument is obvious. It as-
sumes a child's freedom to practice his religion is coextensive with
an adult's and the parent's to aid and encourage him to do so in
public is as broad as his own. In other words, the state's power to
limit what the child may do under a claim of practicing religion
is no broader than in the case of a mature person."
This paragraph was omitted. "You seem to say," the Chief Jus-
tice wrote, that the First Amendment, standing by itself, makes a
difference between the religious freedom guaranteed to an infant
and that guaranteed to an adult. This does not seem to me to be
strictly accurate. The difference, it seems to me, is not to be found
in any distinction to be derived from the First Amendment but from
the fact that other provisions of the Constitution have conferred the
power on the state*** to forbid the employment of children in the
streets***."' Stone thought the point important and Rutledge fol-
lowed his suggestion.
A Law Review commentator argued:
"It cannot be denied that the Prince decision in part qualifies
the Murdock decision. It is one thing for the Court to classify the
public activities of house-to-house canvassing and hand distribution
as such a part of the sect's religious activity as to be immune from
any supervision by licensing and freed from any fees in payment
thereof. It is another thing to hold that if the acts are performed
by minors, they are subject to state regulations. It therefore follows
that all such 'religious activity' is immune from regulation only
when practiced by adults. The effect of the Court's decision-is to
make age rather than the nature of the activity the determinative
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feature," citing Justice Jackson's "separate" opinion.27 To this it
may be observed that the Court presumably would follow Murdock
if, rather than a Child Lab6r law, the Massachusetts statute required
children to obtain licenses.
Justice Jackson joined in another "separate" opinion in a similar
case the following March.28 A municipal ordinance of a small South
Carolina town imposed a license tax on book agents which a local
Witness refused to pay. He peddled the usual tracts, devoting full
time to it. His entire income consisted of the proceeds of his proselyt.
ing activities. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, took the posi-
tion that there was no substantial difference between this case and
the Opelika and Murdock cases. He made the same point, that
"Preachers of the more orthodox faiths are not engaged in com-
mercial undertakings because they are dependent on their calling
for a living. Freedom of religion is not merely reserved for those
with a long purse."
Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson thought the decision
extended the rule announced in the Opelika and Murdock cases.
"Follett the (Witness) is not made to pay a tax for the exercise of
that which the First Amendment has relieved from taxation. He is
made to pay for that for which all others similarly situated must
pay-an excise for the occupation of street vending." They declared
that "In effect the decision grants not free exercise of religion***
but, on the other hand, requires that the exercise of religion be
subsidized."
The subsidy argument was met in Justice Murphy's concurring
opinion. "It is suggested," he wrote, "that we have opened the door
to exemption of wealthy religious institutions like Trinity Church
in New York City, from the payment of taxes on property invest-
ments from which support is derived for religious activities.***
I am neither disturbed nor impressed by these allegations.*** There
is an obvious difference between taxing commercial property and
investments undertaken for profit, whatever use is made of the in-
come, and laying a tax directly on an activity that is essentially
religious in purpose and character.*** 29 It is something of an
over simplification, but in many of its aspects, the nub of the issue
27 32 Geo. L J. 309, 312 (1944).
28 Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944).
29 Ibid., 579.
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here again was whether to characterize the Witness as a preacher
or a book agent-were his activities primarily religious in character
or were they commercial.
Professor Kurland has called attention to the fact that although
the opinion of Jackson, Roberts and Frankfurter made the point
that to relieve the Witness of paying the tax is to relieve him from
"the contribution to the cost of government which everyone else
will have to pay," it did not take up the question whether this does
not violate the separation clause. Kurland's explanation is that the
Justices failed to recognize the inseparable nature of the free exercise
and establishment clauses.30 It would appear here that the two clauses
may, in some situation be in conflict, a point recognized by some
of the Justices when the Court developed more awareness of the
complexity of these problems and a more sophisticated treatment
of them.
Prior to the first flag salute case, decided by the Supreme
Court, it had dismissed several appeals from state court decisions
upholding salute requirements of school children. The Court could
detect no "substantial federal question." 31 In fact, as Justice Frank-
furter pointed out in his dissenting opinion in the second flag case,
the Court had actually affirmed a similar decision in another case
before Gobitis.3
On June 3, 1940, it handed down its decision holding valid a
requirement of a Pennsylvania School Board that all children in
public schools must salute the flag and pledge allegiance to it. The
Gobitis children had refused on religious grounds and had been
expelled. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the opinion for the Court,
with Chief Justice Stone the lone dissenter. Some three years later
Gobitis was overruled in Board o/ Education v. Barnette.33 Between
the two decisions, Chief Justice Hughes had retired and Justice
Stone had taken his place. McReynolds had retired. The two vacancies
were filled by Justices Jackson and Byrnes. Byrnes in turn resigned
in 1942 and was replaced by Justice Rutledge. Thus there were two
30 Kurland, Religion and the Law 67-68 (1962).
31 For example, Leoles v. Landers, 302 U. S. 656 (1937); Hering v.
Board of Education, 303 U. S. 624 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306
U. S. 621 (1939).
32 Johnson v. Deerfiled, 306 U. S. 621 (1939), decision below, 25 F. Supp.
918 (1939).
33 319 U. S. 624 (1943j.
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new members of the Court when the Barnette case came before it.
But since there was but one dissent in Gobitis and a six-judge
majority in Barnette, it is obvious that three Justices had changed
their votes. The three were Justices Murphy, Black and Douglas.
The latter three Justices concurred in Barnette with an ex-
planatory opinion by Black and Douglas. "Reluctance" they wrote
"to make the federal Constitution a rigid bar against state regulation
of conduct thought inimical to the public welfare was the controlling
influence which moved us to consent to the Gobitis decision. Long
reflection convinced us that although the principle is sound, its ap-
plication in the particular case was wrong," (citing the second deci-
sion in Opelika, which overruled the first one.) "Neither our do-
mestic tranquility in peace," they continued, "nor our martial ef-
fort in war depends on compelling little children to participate in
a ceremony which ends in nothing for them but a fear of spiritual
condemnation... The ceremonial, when enforced against conscien-
tious objectors, more likely than to serve its high purpose, is a handy
implement for disguised religious persecution. As such, it is inconsis-
tent with our Constituion's plan and purpose."
These three Justice had, in fact, already announced their change
of heart in their dissent in the first Opelika case. They there wrote:
"The opinion of the Court sanctions a device which in our opinion
suppresses or tends to suppress the free exercise of a religion practiced
by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction which
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, took against the
same religious minority, and is a logical extension of the principles
upon which that decision rested. Since we joined in the opinion in
the Gobitis case, we think this is an appropriate occasion to state
that we now believe that it also was wrongly decided. Certainly our
democratic form of government, functioning under the historic Bill
of Rights, has a high responsibility to accommodate itself to the
religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox
those views may be. The First Amendment does not put the right
freely to exercise religion in a subordinate position. We fear, however,
that the opinions in these and in the Gobitis case do exactly that." 3
Justice Jackson, in the Barnette case wrote one of the Court's
great opinions of all time. "The case is made difficult," he observed,
34 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U. S. 584; 623-624 (1942).
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"not because the principles of its decision are obscure but because
the flag involved is our own. Nevertheless, we apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intelectually and
spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social or-
ganization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory
routine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our insti-
tutions to free minds." It should not require a war between an open
and a closed society to recognize the profound truth of Jackson's
solemn admonition: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dis-
sent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory
unification of opinions achieves only the unanimity of the grave-
yard." 35
Justice Jackson concluded with an eloquent paragraph, repeat-
edly quoted in subsequent opinions. "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."'
Quite naturally, all this Witness litigation attracted wide-spread
attention. After the first Opelika case upholding the tax ordinance
against them, the Court came in for extensive criticism from liberal
sources both lay and professional. Raymond Moley in Newsweek 7
declared, "The decision of the Supreme Court upholding the imposi-
tion of fees on Jehovah's Witnesses for the privilege of distributing
religious tracts is... shocking in its implications. For to whittle away
the freedom of one religion is to attack the freedom of all religion.
To suppress one liberty is to threaten all liberty." Time,3s heading
its news story "Ominous Decision," quoted similar opinions from
various newspapers' editorials.
Comment in the law journals was also highly critical. Here are
some samples: " ***An unlimited power of revocation would seem
to make the ordinance clearly unconstitutional..." 39 "It would
seem that the decision is wrong ... since the power to revoke a
license appears as great a threat of censorship as the power to deny
3s 319 U. S. 624, 641.
s7 Ibid., 642.
37 June 29, 1942.
3 June 22, 1942.39 91 U. Pa. L Rev. 75, 76 (1942).
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one in the first place." 4 It is feared that the principle case.. . "will
offer an excellent opportunity to those who seek the suppression of
this unpopular minority." In fact the writer anticipated the precise
analogy subsequently used by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Mtrdock
case. "Jehovah's Witnesses are no more peddlers than the ordinary
minister who preaches a sermon from the pulpit and pases a collec-
tion plate." 4' Critical of the Court's treatment of the activities of
the Witnesses as "commercial" the Fordham Law Review asked,
"when is 'money earned?' . . .In the instant case the majority ap-
pears content with a finding that money was collected." 42 (Emphasis
original.) The Yale Law Journal expressed the thrust of most com-
ment, namely, that the decision was "a serious threat to civil
liberties." 43
The Gobitis flag case had aroused similar expressions of concern
as to the future of religious freedom in the country. "If individual
liberties are something more than the by-product of a democratic
process, if in fact they have an intrinsic value worthy of protection,
it is difficult to justify a decision which subordinates a fundamental
liberty to a legislative program of questionable worth," declared
the Michigan Law Review. 44 The New York University Law Review
expressed a similar view: "The Court's acceptance of so vaguely
defined an interest as 'national unity' and its refusal to scrutinize
the legislative judgment is open to criticism." 45 Writing a year and
a half after the decision, William A. Fennell observed: "The un-
fortunate effects of.the decision during the past year are now a
matter of public record." 46 He then discussed a New Hampshire
case in which, after two children had been suspended from school
for refusing to salute the flag and their parents, unable to send them
to a private school, were instructing them at home. The children
were committed to the State Industrial School as delinquents. Fortu-
nately for this troubled family, the Supreme Court of the State
reversed this decision on the grounds of statutory interpretation. It
could not attribute to the legislature an intent "to authorize the
40 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1200, 1201 (1942).
41 29 Va. L Rev. 339, 340 (1942).
42 11 Fordham L. Rev. 304, 310 (1942).
43 52 Yale L. J. 168, 174 (1942).
" 39 Mich. L. Rev. 149, 152 (1940).
45 18 N.Y. LQ. Rev. 124, 127 (1940)
46 19 N.Y. L.Q. Rev. 31, 42 (1941).
REVISTA IURIDICA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE PUERTO RICO
breaking up of family life for no other reason than because some
of its members have conscientious religious scruples not shared by
a majority of the community."" 7 A similar case in New York
arrived at the same result.48
When the Court reversed the first Opelika case, the liberal press
was exultant. "The outright about-face," wrote Irving Dilliard'in the
New Republic,49 "of the United States Supreme Court on the consti-
tutionality of city ordinances under which members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses sect were convicted for distributing religious literature
without a license is one of the most notable acts in the entire span
of 154 years of Supreme Court history."
The New York Times, in its editorial for May 4, 1943, com-
mented as follows: "The vote of the Supreme Court's latest member,
Justice Rutledge, was decisive in two opinions rendered yesterday,
one of which reversed a position taken last June, and both of which
taken together, reaffirmed the right of Jehovah's Witnesses to agitate
for their unusual creed... It is a gross under-statement to say that
Jehovah's Witnesses are not popular in this country. Their beliefs
are their own concern, but their methods of urging them upon other
people are annoying... Yet, if we permit extremists of an unpleasant
sort to be deprived of their rights, it is hard to tell where the line
can be drawn and who is to be deemed secure. We think the rights
of all Americans are a little safer because Jehovah's Witnesses have
had their second day in court."
The Washington Post: declared "Monday's action by the Court
is of tremendous historical importance." The St. Louis Post Dis-
patch5' expressed the view that "The first two of President Roose-
velt's four freedoms-freedom of speech and freedom of religion-
have been staunchly bulwarked in the United States by the Supreme
Court by the reversal of its sorely mistaken Opelika decision of last
June 8th.. Justice Rutledge has tipped the scales on the side of
the cherished freedoms of the Bill of Rights." Even the Chicago
Tribune,5 a newspaper not often belligerent in support of the Bill
47 New Hampshire v. Lefebvre, 91 N. H. 382, 385, 20 A. 2d. 185, 187
(1941).
48 In re Reed, 262 App. Div. 814, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 92 (1941).
49 May 24, 1943.
50 May 5, 1943.
51 May 4, 1943.
52 May 5, 1943.
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of Rights, applauded the decision. The reason, however, was ap-
parent-the shoe had been on a different foot or the other axe had
been ground. "The Tribune greets this opinion with special satisfac-
tion because the Court has carried forward the trend to which this
newspaper contributed much of the original impetus." It then refer-
red to its victory in a libel suit brought against it by the City of
Chicago, 3 and the Minnesota free press case5' in which the Supreme
Court held invalid an injunction against the publication of a news-
paper as "previous restraint," contrary to the First Amendment.
With the resignation of Justice Byrnes, it was recognized in
many quarters that a shift in the Court's point of view on such
controversial issues by a sharply divided Court was quite possible.
The Christian Century for January 13, 1943, had editorialized:"
... The man whom President Roosevelt appoints to the Supreme
Bench may well have it within his single power to answer that
question. The greater the importance, therefore, that the choice be
made with great care and passed on by the Senate with full con-
sideration of all that is at stake." In its January 27 issue, the magazine
expressed satisfaction with Rutledge's nomination by the President.
"The new Justice should prove to be a stalwart champion of religious
liberty and civil rights... The Christian Century has tried to em-
phasize the interest which the churches have in securing a Justice
who, in the present evenly divided state of the Supreme Court, can
be depended upon to uphold freedom of conscience and speech. Pre-
sident Roosevelt appears to have chosen just such a man." No editor
ever made a more accurate prediction.
Justice Rutledge's performance in the Jehovah Witnesses cases
was in fact surprising to no one who had followed his work on the
Court of Appeals. Less than a year before he took his seat on the
High Court, he had dissented in a case involving much the same
issues as in Opelika. Several Witnesses had been convicted of selling
tracts on the streets of the District of Columbia without a license
or paying a tax. Each had been fined five dollars (what the license
in question would have cost) and sentenced to one day in jail.
The license law was upheld by two members of a three-Judge Court.5
In his dissent Judge Rutledge indicated that the statute should
53 City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Il1. 595, 139 N. E. (1923).
54 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
55 Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F. 2d 24 (1942).
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not be applicable to appellant's "selling" their pamphlets. With them,
it was a religion, not a business. (The same issue, over and over
again.) But, if applicable, he thought the law unconstitutional. Refer-
ring to the Gobitis flag case, he wrote: "Jehovah's Witnesses have
had to choose between their consciences and public education for
their children. In my judgment, they should not have to give up also
the right to disseminate their religious views in an orderly manner
on the public streets, exercise it at the whim of public officials (the
law vested discretion without express limitations in the licensing
officials), or be taxed for doing so without their licenses."
Although it had not always been true of previous, nor, for
that matter, of succeeding Justices, it was not to be assumed that
Rutledge would change his attitude or his constitutional philosphy
once he found himself in a position to make it most effective. When
appointed, it was altogether predictable what his position would be
in this series of cases with the possible exception of the Massachu-
setts child labor case.
After the 1943 favorable decisions, the Witnesses took great
pride in themselves as "molders of constitutional law." They refer-
red to May 3rd and June 14th of 1943 as "Field Days" by winning
12 out of 13 cases, leading ones, of course, being Opelika, Murdock
and Barnette. "As a result, beginning in the summer of the year
1943, there was a marked decline in the number of cases brought
against Jehovah's Witnesses. Simultaneously, there was a tremendous
increase in the number of prosecutions that were dismissed." 5 Char-
les A. Beard pleased them greatly when he wrote, "Whatever may
be said about the Witnesses, they have the courage of martyrs. And
they have money to hire lawyers and fight cases through the courts.
As a result in recent days, they have made more contributions to
the development of the constitutional law of religious liberty than
any other cult or group." -7 And this remains true today.
II
The "Wall"
The New Jersey school bus case (Everson v. Board of Educa-
56 Jehovah's Witnesses in the Divine Purpose 209 (1945).
57 The Republic 173 (1943).
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tion),58 decided in 1947, was one of the most controversial cases in
which Justice Rutledge took part and wrote an opinion. The state
legislature had enacted a law authorizing local school boards to
make rules and enter into agreements for the transportation of
children to schools and back home. Pursuant to this statute a town-
ship board provided for reimbursement of parents for transporta-
tion costs in buses of the public transportation system. It included
reimbursement to parents who sent their children to public schools
and to Catholic parochial schools. Transportation to private schools
operated for profit was expressly excluded. The parochial schools,
of course, gave religious as well as secular instruction. A taxpayer
challenged the power of the school board to reimburse from public
funds parents of Catholic school children.
Although a number of cases had reached the Supreme Court
involving the free practice of religion clause of the First Amendment,
this was the first to raise questions concerning the meaning and
scope of the provision forbidding any "law respecting the establish-
ment of religion." The principal issue was whether this law was one
which violated the establishment clause, as applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, by being in substance a law
aiding religion. A secondary point raised was whether the law of-
fended the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as taking money from some people by taxation to help others carry
out their personal desires and purposes.
The Court upheld the state law by a five to four vote of the
Justices. In his majority opinion, Justice Black quickly disposed of
the due process argument: "The fact that a state law, passed to
satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal desires of the
individuals most directly affected," he wrote, "is certainly an in-
adequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously ap-
praised the public need." He declared that legislation intended to
facilitate opportunity for children to get a secular education serves
a public purpose. So also does legislation to enable children to avoid
the "risk of traffic and other hazards incident to walking or "hitch
hiking" to school. 'Moreover, subsidies to individuals, Whether parents
of school children, farmers or home owners, to further a public
purpose, are valid. A case closely in point, decided in 1930, had
58 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. Sz 1 (1947).
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upheld a Louisiana law challenged under the due process clause,
(but not the First Amendment), which provided for the use of tax
funds for the purpose of buying school books for children attending
private and parochial schools. In an opinion written by Chief Jus-
tice Hughes, such expenditures were held to be for a "public purpose"
and valid under the Fourteenth Amendment. 59
The case under the establishment clause, however, was not a
"horse (so) quickly curried." 6 There were no judicial guideposts.
There were, however, the writings of Jefferson and Madison, which,
more than any other force, were responsible for the First Amend-
ment. Particularly, there was Madison's famous "Memorial and
Remonstrance," which brought about the termination in Virginia of
taxation to support religion, and Jefferson's "Bill for Religious
Freedom" enacted shortly thereafter, in 1786. Then, of course, there
was the history of religious intolerance with its bloody record of
torture, persecution and execution of individuals and even wars
between nations.
Champions of the "Wall of Separation" believed it necessary
for the purity of religion and the integrity of the state although
some would emphasize the one more than the other. Roger Williams,
a deeply devout man, was one of the first to declare for separation
and for which he has banished from Massachusetts. The great danger,
for him, was the corruption of religion. One of the things he re-
garded as intolerable was a uniform and compulsory prayer which
he ch-racterized as "spiritual rape." 61 This view was shared by
Madison. "Experience shows," he wrote, "religion corrupted by es-
tablishments." 62 He also emphasized, of course, the corrupting ef-
fect of religion on the state. "What influence in fact," he asked,
"have ecclesiastical establishments had on Civil Society? In some
instances they have been seen to erect a spiritual tyranny on the
ruins of Civil authority; in many instances they have been seen
upholding the thrones of political tyranny; in no instance have they
been seen as guardians of the liberties of the people." 6
59 Cochran v. Board of Education, 281 U. S. 370 (1930).
60 Frankfurter, J., in Olberding v. Illinois Central R. Co., 346 U. S. 338
(1953).
61 See Cahn, On Government and Prayer, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 981, 984
(1962).
62 Letters and Writings, Vol. 1, 16 (Lippencott, 1885).
63 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.
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It was on such a note that Justice Black began his discussion.
"A large proportion of the early settlers of this country came here
from Europe to escape the bondage of laws which compelled them
to support and attend government favored churches." He then con-
tinued: "With the power of government supporting them, at various
times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants
had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Prot-
estant sects, Catholics of one shade of belief had persecuted Catholics
of another shade of belief, and all of these had from time to time
persecuted Jews. In efforts to force loyalty to whatever religious
group happened to be on top and in league with the government of
a particular time and place, men and wbmen had been fined, cast
in jail, cruelly tortured and killed.* These practices of the old
world were transplanted to and began to thrive in the soil of the
new America." 64
After reviewing the history of the separation struggle leading
to the First Amendment, Black began a catalogue of the things
neither state nor Federal government can do. Neither Government
"can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.** No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.'* "65
As to what New Jersey had done, he found that it was not a
law prohibited by the establishment clause although it might ap-
proach "the verge" of the state's constitutional power. It was true
that children were "helped to get to church schools." Perhaps some
children might not be sent to church schools if free transportation
had been limited to public schools. But, Black argued, the same
result might ensue if policemen paid by the city did not protect
children from traffic hazards on their way to parochial schools or
if the city cut off from them such general public services as fire
protection and sewage disposal. But the First Amendment was not
intended to prevent the state from furnishing such services. It
"requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of re-
ligious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to
be their adversary." And then the final conclusion: "the State con-
" 330 U. S. 1, 8-9.
65 Ibid., 15-16.
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tributes no 'Money to the schools. It does not support them. Its le-
gislation, as applied, does no more than provide a general program
to help parents get their children, regardless of religion, safely and
expeditiously to and from accredited Schools." 6
To many readers, Black's opinion makes little sense. By the time
he finishes with what a state may not do, there seems no way in
which the decision can be supported. This was Irving Brant's reac-
tion. "When I started to read the Everson case," he wrote to Rutledge,
"I flipped the leaves and missed the break in it, therefore thought it
was a unanimous decision. As I read along through Hugo's opinion,
I got a real lift; it showed such a complete understanding of the
principles which governed the writing of the First Amendment. At
one point, I got out the manuscript of one of the chapters of the
(i. e., Brant's) unpublished volume on Madison and read parallel
sections to Hazeldean (Mrs. Brant), to show how even the wording
was almost duplicated. Then, by gosh, on a point negatived by his
own prior reasoning, he jumped over and affirmed the decision." 67
Justice Jackson, in the beginning of his dissenting opinion also
pointed up the apparent inconsistency between what he called "the
-undertones of the (majority) opinion advocating complete and un-
compromising separation of Church from State" and the conclusion
upholding the New Jersey law. It was, he thought, another case of
Byron's Julia who, "Whispering, 'I will ne' er consent'-consent-
,ed."6
He also thought that the law made the character of the school
rather than the needs of the children determine whether the parents
could be reimbursed. Payments could be made for transportation to
public schools and Catholic schools but not to private schools operated
for profit. Moreover, under the provisions made by the local board,
transportation to any religious school other than Catholic was ex-
cluded. Thus, if "all children of the state were objects of impartial
solicitude," there was no sound reason for discrimination.
But it was Justice Rutledge's classic dissent, reviewing the his-
tory of the struggle for the separation of government and religion,
which brings conviction, in Justice Jackson's words, that the Court's
decision gave "the clock's hands a backward turn." With scholarly
66 Ibid,, 17-18.
67 Letter from Vancouver Island, British Columbia, March 11, 1947.
68 Ibid., 19.
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care he reviewed the Virginia fight for religious freedom. Although
reliance on Madison and Jefferson had been recently belittled by
some critics,69 Rutledge made a convincing case that the great instru-
ments of the Virginia experience "became the warp and woof of our
constitutional tradition" and that Madison was indeed the architect
,of the Federal "Wall." "By contrast with the Virginia history, the
congressional debates on consideration of the Amendment reveal only
-sparse discussion, reflecting the fact that the essential issues had
:been settled." 70
In view of the events leading up to the Amendment and its
ihistory, it was clear to Rutledge that any appropriation from public
funds to aid or support any religious exercise was forbidden. Not
even "three pence" contribution, as Madison had declared. Did the
New Jersey law furnish aid or support for religion by the taxing
power? "Certainly it does," he insisted, "if the test remains undiluted
as Jefferson and Madison made it, that money taken by taxation
from one is not to be used or given to support another's religious
training or belief, or indeed one's own." But the majority appeared
to take the position that the collateral "aid" to religious instructions
was not what the law contemplated as "support" to religion. To this,
Rutledge answered: "But Madison and Jefferson were concerned
with aid and support in fact, not as a legal conclusion 'entangled in
procedents.'" He thought New Jersey's action was exactly the type
of evil at which they struck. "Under the test they framed it cannot
be said that the cost of transportation is no part of the cost of
-education or of the religious instruction given." And he added, sig-
nificantly, "that it is a substantial and necessary element is shown
most plainly by the continuing and increasing demand for the state
'to assume it." 71
It was also obvious to Rutledge that where transportation was
required to get children to school, its cost is as much a part of the
,expense of education as the cost of school books, school lunches,
athletic equipment or any other item of the total financial burden.
There was, of course, no denial that the Catholic schools gave both
religious and non-religious instruction. The very purpose of their
69 See Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 3 (1949).
70 330 U. S. 42.
71 Ibid., 46.
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existence was the combination of the religious and the secular. But
"this very admixture is what was disestablished when the First
Amendment forbade 'an establishment of religion.'" Would the
Constitution permit the state to defray the cost of transportation of
children to Sunday School, week day special religious classes at the
church or parish house or to meetings of young people's religious
societies, such as the Y.M.C.A., the Y.W.C.A., or the Y.M.H.A.
even though some nonreligious subjects might be discussed? The
argument that defraying transportation cost was not "support" was
as flimsy to Rutledge as the same argument would be if applied to
the payment of tuition, teachers' salaries or the cost of construction
of a school building He could find no substantial difference except
"between more dollars and less." If all that is necessary to evade
the force of the Amendment is to find that the appropriation is for
a "public purpose," that it is "public welfare legislation," then,
indeed the state could build school buildings for religious groups,
equip them, pay teachers' salaries and pupils' tuition. The trouble
with the "public purpose" argument was, he thought, that it ignored
the religious factor, the vital element in the case.
The Justice recognized the hardship upon those who are taxed
to pay for the education of other people's children but have an
added cost for the education of their own. But this is because they
are not content with what the state can constitutionally furnish in
the field of education, namely, purely secular instruction. And if
the state were to include religious training in any faith but their
own, they would be the first to protest. Thus Rutledge concluded
his opinion:
"Two great drives are constantly in motion to abridge, in the
name of education, the complete division of religion and civil au-
thority which our forefathers made. One is to introduce religious
education and observances into the public schools. The other, to>
obtain public funds for the aid and support of various private re-
ligious schools.*** In my opinion both avenues were closed by the
Constitution. Neither should be opened by this Court. The matter
is not one of quantity, to be measured by the amount of money
expended. Now, as in Madison's day, it is one of principle, to keep
separate the separate spheres as the First Amendment drew them;
to prevent the first experiment upon our liberties; and to keep the
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question from becoming entangled in corrosive precedents." 72 Cer-
tainly recent history in the country confirms the fact that the "two
great drives" are still very much in motion "to abridge the division
of religious and civil authority which our forefathers made."
At several places in his dissent, Rutledge emphasized the point
that the relatively small amount of tax aid to religious schools which
was involved was not significant. This apparently inspired the edi-
torial writer for the Washington Post, as follows: 73 " **Justice
Black's argument favoring this small encroachment upon a constitu-
tional principle reminds us of the young woman who tried to excuse
transgression of the moral law by saying that her illegitimate child
was 'only a small one.' It is the principle that is vital, as Justice
Rutledge made clear in his powerful dissent, and not the amount
of the assistance given. Taxes are wholly public. The religious func-
tion is wholly private. The two cannot be intermingled in our opinion
without grave damage to both." And the Times observed, pro-
phetically, that the vigor with which four Justices dissented in this
case suggests that "this is only the beginning of a grave judicial
controversy."
The controversy was resumed the very next year in the McCol-
lun release time case74 in which the Court held invalid under the
establishment clause, the practice in the Illinois public school system
which excused students, whose parents so elected, from school clas-
ses in order to take religious instruction on the school premises.
Others were required to continue their secular studies. Justice Black
again wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Reed alone dissented.
The situation had developed from the adoption by the school
board of Champaign, Illinois of a plan for religious instruction ori-
ginated by the Champaign Council on Religious Education which
included representatives of Protestants, Catholics and Jews. When
the program was inaugurated, each parent received a "Parents'
Request Card" with instructions to furnish the information desired.
These cards were in the following form:
"Please permit in Grade at
School to attend a class in Religious Education one period a
72 Ibid., 63.
73 Feb. 13, 1947.
74 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948).
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(Check which) ( ) Roman Catholic
( ) Jewish
Date
The mother of the McCollum boy refused to let him participate.
She had been reared as a Freethinker and would have no part of the
"traditional, organized religions. When she learned that her son had
been given a place at a desk in the hall during "release-time" and
was the butt of jeers and sneers by conforming pupils, Vashti McCol-
lum started her lawsuit.
Although the sponsoring organization which also supplied the
religious instructors, was inter-faith, it in fact failed to provide in-
struction in all three faiths for every school, with the result that in
several instances Catholic and Jewish pupils were sent to Protestant
classes. Many church groups expressed disapproval of the program,
particularly Unitarian and Jewish. Indeed, some Baptists, presumably
following in the tradition of Roger Williams, reputedly the founder
of the first American Baptist Church in Rhode Island after leaving
Massachusetts, vigorously opposed the practice although others sup-
ported it. Notwithstanding Jewish participation, a brief, amicus
curiae (friend of the court) was filed on behalf of the Synagogue
Council of America. The brief protested the use of the public schools
and facilities on the grounds that it amounted to financial aid to
sectarian religious instruction, that it favored one religion over
another and thus discriminated, and that it in fact influenced and
enforced religious instruction upon children contrary to theirs and
their parents' wishes.
Four years later, the Court backtracked, upholding a release
time New York law which required the children who were excused
for religious training to leave the school premises to obtain it. The
off-premises factor was thought to distinguish the situation from
the Illinois case. Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson wrote
separate dissents in this case. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court,
joined by Chief Justice Vinson, Justices Reed and Burton as well
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as Justice Minton and Clark who had taken the seats vacated by
the deaths of Rutledge and Murphy. 5 One could safely guess that
the decision would have been otherwise had they lived.
And then, the Prayer case, in which Black once again writes
for the Court, Justices Frankfurter and White taking no part, Justice
Stewart, the lone dissenter. 76 A government agency had composed a
prayer for school children to recite. But although the Court did not
characterize it as "spiritual rape," it thought that "it is no part of
the business of government to compose official prayers***."
Justice Black reviewed the clash of opinions over the prayers
of the Church of England and the history of the Book of Cannon
Prayer: "The controversies over the Book and what should be its
content," wrote Black, "repeatedly threatened to disrupt the peace
of that country as the accepted forms of prayer in the established
church changed with the views of the particular rule that happened
to be control at the time.*** It is an unfortunate fact of history
that when some of the very groups which had most strenously op-
posed the established Church of England found themselves sufficiently
in control of colonial governments in this country to write their own
prayers into law, they passed laws making their own religions the
official religion of their respective colonies. * * * By the time of the
adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was a
widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a
union of Church and State. These people knew, some of them from
bitter personal experience, that one of the greatest dangers to the
freedom of the individual to worship in his own way lay in the
Government's placing its official stamp of approval upon one par-
ticular kind of prayer.*** The First Amendment was added to the
Constitution to stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor
the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control,
support or influence the kinds of prayer the American people can
say.** ,77
Justice Stewart found that Black's historical review of the quar-
rels over the Book of Common Prayer in England and the history
of the early establishment and later rejection of an official church
in our own states threw no light for him on the issue in the case.
75 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952).
76 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421 (1962).
77 Ibid., 426, 427, 429.
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He simply could not understand how it could be a violation of the
Constitution to permit school children who wished to do so to recite
the twenty-two word prayer. He thought it neither interfered with
the free practice of anyone's religion nor established an official re-
ligion. On the contrary, according to Stewart, to deny the wish of
the children to join in the prayer was "to deny them the opportunity
.o share in the spiritual heritage of the Nation."
Justice Douglas had voted with the majority in the New Jersey
school bus case and had written the opinion for the Court in the
New York release time case. But in the prayer case, he was not
content merely to join in the decision. He apparently felt constrained
to write a concurring opinion even though the prayer involved was
only a "little one." It may or may not be significant that in Justice
Black's opinion, no mention is made of the New Jersey case except,
altogether collaterally, in a footnote. But Douglas felt it necessary
to repent in public and, belatedly, join in Rutledge's dissent in that
case. And so he wrote :78 "Mr. Justice Rutledge stated in dissent what
I think is durable First Amendment philosophy" and thereupon
quoted the following passage:
"The reasons underlying the Amendment's policy have not van-
ished with time or diminished in force. Now, as when it was adopted,
the price of religious freedom is double. It is that the church and
religion shall live both within and upon that freedom. There cannot
be freedom of religion, safeguarded by the state, and intervention by
the church or its agencies in the state's domain or dependency on
its largesse. Madison's Remonstrace, Par. 6, 8. The great condition
of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance, as
.also from interference, by the state. For when it comes to rest upon
that secular foundation it vanishes with the resting. Id., 'Par. 7, 8.
Public money devoted to payment of religious costs, educational or
other, brings the quest for more. It brings too the struggle of sect
against sect for the larger share or for any. Here one by numbers
alone will benefit most, there another. That is precisely the history
of societies which have had an established religion and dissident
groups. Id., Par. 8, 11. It is the very thing Jefferson and Madison
experienced and sought to guard against, whether in its blunt or in
its more screened forms. Ibif. The end of such strife cannot be-other
78 370 U. Q. 421, 443-444.
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than to destroy the cherished liberty. The dominating group will
achieve the dominate benefit; or all will embroil the state in their
dissensions. Id., Par. 11."
Justice Rutledge's post Everson mail was especially heavy-more
so, indeed than about any other case in which he participated. Most
of it was extremely favorable. This was true not only from personal
friends but from strangers, as well, in all walks of life. Not untypical
was a brief note from Max Lerner, then writing for New York's
P. M. and who had never met the Justice. Lerner wrote as follows:
"Dear Mr. Justice Rutledge:
"I want to tell you how exciting I found your dissent in the
Everson case. I count it as one of the great opinions of recent years,
and it puts you in the company of the choice spirits in the great
tradition of the Court."
An article in the magazine America by R. F. Drinan, S. J., sum-
marized the comments of the leading law journals on the case. "The
Everson case," he wrote, "in which a New Jersey statute authorizing
funds for bus transportation of children going to parochial schools
was held constitutional, elicited some twenty comments, more than
did any case decided by any court in the nation in recent years.
The overwhelming majority of these comments specifically support
the dissent of Justice Rutledge, in which he held that any State aid
to a religious organization, however incidental, is forbidden by the
First Amendment. Discrimination against religious institutions in the
gratuitous distribution of public funds is commanded by the Consti-
tution, according to the Michigan Law Review. The commentator in
the Harvard Law Review questions the validity of the 'child-benefit'
theory (i.e., the child in a sectarian school gets the benefit of in-
cidental aid, not the school) and insists that all state aid to sectarian
institutions should be barred.*** New York University's Law Review
gives a qualified approval to the decision but observes that further
extensions of the doctrine might very well be disastrous so far as
separation of Church and State is concerned." 7
Among the professional critics of the Court and its decisions,
few have exceeded the late Professor T. R. Powell of the Harvard
Law School in perspicuity or perspicacity. In discussing the Everson
case in the Harvard Educational Review, 0 he wrote:
79 America, March 5, 1949, 593.
80 Vol. XVII, 82 (1947).
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"Public assistance to private worship within ecclesiastical walls
seems clearly to be support of such worship even though the money
goes to carry communicants and not for heat and light and pay of
priests and persons. How is it different to go to rooms with desks
and blackboards instead of to transept, nave and choir? The majority
do not tell us. Quite possibly they may have been influenced by the
facts that parochial schools save public expense and that Catholic
citizens are taxed to support public schools and their appurtenances.
They might differentiate free rides to private churches because there
are no public churches. No one can be compelled to go to church.
Children may be compelled to go to school, but they may not be
compelled to go to public school. Thus a public ride to the school of
their choice helps them to do a duty laid down by law. So might
the majority reason. The reasoning would be acceptable if the only
question were whether the expenditure is for a public or for a private
purpose. It is far less acceptable when to the public purpose of
education is added the private purpose of indoctrination in denomi-
national dogma. Then the state is spending public funds to aid access
to private preaching of a sectarian creed. To add to the audience is
pro tanto to promote the preaching."
Editorial, critical and popular opinion appeared highly divided
after the McCollum and Regents' Prayer cases. For example, a Ten-
nessee newspaper, heading its editorial, "Court Rules Against God,"
declared that "American citizen who fear and worship God should
be deeply disturbed by the United States Supreme Court's far fetched
ruling, in a Champaign, Ill. case, that a voluntary Bible study plan
in public schools is unconstitutional.*** It was an arbitrary ruling in
keeping with the so-called 'liberalism' with which society is currently
afflicted." 81
On the other hand, a Missouri newspaper, anticipating the
Court's ruling, thought that the public school is no place to teach
sectarian beliefs. Denominational teaching is the responsibility of
pastors and parents. The places for it are the church, the Sunday
School and the home.P2 Similar approving editorials appeared in the
Washington Post, The Evening Star (Washington, D. C.), and a
61 Chatanooga News-Free Press, March 10, 1948.
82 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 7, 1947.
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number of other city newspapers, including, surprisingly, the Chicago
Tribune.8 3
Professor S. Corwin of Princeton took a different view. In an
article in Fordman University's magazine Thought, he severely cri-
ticized the case. His summary of the argument against the decision
follows :84
" ***In the first place the justification for the Court's interven-
tion was most insubstantial. In the second place the decision is based,
as Justice Reed rightly contends, on "a figure of speech," the concept
of "a wall of separation between Church and State." Thirdly, leaving
this figure of speech to one side, the decision is seen to stem from
an unhistorical conception of what is meant by "an estabflshment
of religion" in the First Amendment. The historical record shows
clearly that the core idea of "an establishment of religion" comprises
the idea of preference; and that any act of public authority favorable
to religion in general cannot, without a falsification of history, be
brought under the ban of that phrase. Undoubtedly, the Court has
the right to make history, as it has often done in the past; but it
has no right to remake it. In the fourth place, the prohibition of the
establishment of religion by Congress is not convertible into a similar
prohibition on the States, under the authorization of the Fourteenth
Amendment, unless the term 'establishment of religion' be given an
application which carries with it invasion of somebody's freedom of
religion, that is, of 'liberty.' Finally, the decision is accompanied by
opinions and by a mandate which together have created great un-
certainty in the minds of governing bodies of all public educational
institutions. And of course, as is always the case, the Court's interven-
tion is purely negative. It is incapable of solving the complex pro-
blems with which forty-six states and 2,200 communities have been
struggling by means of the 'released time' expedient. With the ut-
most insouciance the Court overturns or casts under the shadow of
unconstitutionality the 'conscientious attempt' of hundreds of people
to deal with what they consider to be a pressing problem in a way
that they considered to be fair and just to all."
83 See the sampling of editorial comment in Liberty Magazine, Third
Quarter, 1948.
84 Thought, 681 (December, 1948).
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After the prayer cases, an extensive sampling of conflicting views
went something like this:85
"The Congress should at once submit an amendment to the
Constitution which establishes the right to religious devotion in all
governmental agencies-national, state or local."-former President
Herbert Hoover.
"I realize, of course, that the Declaration of Independence an-
tedates the Constitution, but the fact remains that the Declaration
was our certificate of national birth. It specifically asserts that we
as individuals possess certain rights as an endowment from our com-
mon creator-a religious concept-former President Dwight D.
Eisenhower.
"I am shocked and frightened that the Supreme Court has
declared unconstitutional a simple and voluntary declaration of belief
in God by public school children. The decision strikes at the very
heart of the Godly tradition in which America's children have for so
long been raised--Cardinal Spellman of New York.
"The recitation of prayers in the public schools, which is tanta-
mount to the teaching of prayer, is not in conformity with the spirit
of the American concept of the separation of church and state. All
the religious groups in this country will best advance their respective
faiths by adherence to this principle-New York Board of Rabbis.
"This is another step toward the secularization of the United
States. Followed to its logical conclusion, we will have to take the
chaplains out of the armed forces, prayers cannot be said to Con-
gress, and the President cannot put his hand on the Bible when he
takes the oath of office. The framers of our Constitution meant we
were to have freedom of religion not freedom from religion.-Evan-
gelist Billy Graham.
"I am surprised that the Court has extended to an obviously
nonsectarian prayer the prohibition against 'the establishment of
religion' which was clearly intended by our forefathers to bar official
status to any particula r denomination or sect.-Bishop James A. Pike,
of the California Protestant Episcopal diocese.
"All parties agreed that the prayer was religious in nature.
This being so, it ran contrary to the First Amendment-which is
85 New York Times, June 30 and July 1, 1962.
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well grounded in history and has served to save the United States
from religious strife.-Representative Emanuel Celler, D., New York.
. "I believe it is no loss to religion but may be again in clarifying
matters. Prayer that is essentially a ceremonial classroom function
has not much religious value.-Dr. Sterling M. McMurrin, United
States Commissioner of Education.
It is important that people not be misled by distorted state-
ments about the decision. The Supreme Court has nowhere in its
decisi6n denied belief in God, prayer, religious songs, Bible reading,
or any other religious belief or practice.-Rabbi Albert M. Lewis,
Los Angeles, West Cost president of the American Jewish Congress.
"We hear a good deal of talk about the rights of minorities
in a democratic society-and this is as it should be. But we have
come to the point where we must give some attention to the rights
of majorities as well and very few are prepared to raise their voices
in this cause. As in the present situation concerning prayer in school,
the long-standing traditions of the Republic are under continual
assault.-The Pilot, Roman Catholic weekly, Boston.
"We are not excited about the decision, either way the decision
denies no one his opportunity to pray in the manner his conscience
dictates. If our religious faith is weakened by lack of a public school
prayer, it is already on the road to extinction.-Detroit News.
"Wisely, the founders of this country saw that the power to
embrace or sponsor any particular religious form or religious group
likely would be abused.*** Monday's decision has not dealt a blow
to religion.'* On the contrary, it has fortified constitutional guaran.
tees that our Government must leave each individual free to worship
in his own way.-Atlanta Constitution.
"The United States Supreme Court has extended the logic of
the constitutional prohibition of the 'establishment of religion'
straight out of the realm of common sense.*** This decision inter-
prets the Constitution with a rigidity which is ridiculous.-Raleigh
(N.C.) News and Observer.
"I think that it is important for us, if we're going to maintain
oiur constitutional principle, that we support Supreme Court decisions
even when we may not agree with them. In addition, we have in
this case a very easy remedy, and that is to pray ourselves.-Pre-
sident Kennedy.
"The decision came as no surprise to me. It is just one in line
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with the philosophy this group of men sitting over there have been
handing down for a long time.*** There are many instances where
the Court has overstepped its bounds.-Representative Francis E.
Walter, D. Pa., Chairmian House Committee on Un-American Ac-
tivities.
"I disagree with the Supreme Court's decision.** Having said.
this, I must also express my concern about some of the reaction to
the Supreme Court's decision. It should not be used as an excuse
for another massive assault upon the institutions of the Court. Right
or wrong, the Supreme Court is a vital part of our Republic, and it
does not serve any point of view in this controversy to heap abuse
upon its members or to undermine its status.-Senaztor Kenneth B.
Keating, R., N. Y.
"Can it be that we, too are ready to embrace the foul concept
of atheism... Is this not in fact the first step on the road to prompt-
ing atheistic and agnostic beliefs?*** Somebody is tampering with
America's soul. I leave to you who that somebody is.-Senator Robert
C. Byrd, D., W. Via.
"For some years now the members of the Supreme Court have
persisted in reading alien meanings into the Constitution of the
United States... they have sought, in effect, to change our form of
government. But never in the wildest of their excesses. '  have they
gone as far as they did on yesterday.-Senator Herman Talndge,
D., Ga.
"We do not impugn the sincerity of most of those who favor
the Supreme Court decision, many of whom are themselves devoted
to religion. But they are in serious error if they think nonsectarian
prayer to God, not forced on anyone, is a violation of rights. Rather
it is the Supreme Court which is guilty of violating the 'free exercise'
of religion guaranteed by the Constitution.-San Francisco Exami-
ner."
"If we accept the ruling with respect, and calm, we will not
stumble to the conclusion that a serious blow has been struck to
the very core of religious teaching.
If we seek ways to live with the decree against official prayer,.
to understand it, we certainly can reach an accommodation less
troublesome than some see possible in these first hours when striking
headlines leave many in a state of disbelief. The court's intent-and.
eventually, we trust, its great achievement-is to strengthen the
JUSTICE RUTLEDGE AND THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES...
foundation of religious heritage by limiting secular intrusions that
could become a mischievous and enervating force. If it does not
work this way, changes can be made.-The New York Herald Tr-
1,une."
"It is naive to see in this decision the hand of communism. A
Communist state does have a state religion-communism-one of
whose tenets is atheism. The whole power of the state is behind it.
The net result of the court's decision, by contrast, is to leave us free.
We can be sure that in God We Trust will remain stamped upon
our coins, as it has upon the heart of most of us.-The Hart/ord
Courant."
"The Court has correctly interpreted the Constitution in this
instance. Those religious leaders of various faiths who disagree will,
we believe, ultimately come to the same conclusion. Separation of
church and state is the best guarantee they have that they and their
followers will always be permitted to worship God according to the
dictates of their own conscience.-The Chicago Sun-Times."
"This is America, and in America loyal citizens accept decisions
whether they like them or not, until they can change them legally,
just as they changed the Eighteenth Amendment. If they cannot
change them legally they accept them. This is the strength of America.
"After all, prayer has not been outlawed in the United States,
nor has religion been outlawed-save in the public schools, and at-
tempts to compare the Supreme Court ruling and lack of religion
in Soviet Russia are wide of the mark.-The Cleveland Plain Dealer."
"Brief reflection might well induce critics to some second-
thought questions. What if the prayer were not as 'neutral' as it is?
What if one denomination, numerically large enough to wield political
control, had dictated it? What of the freedom of conscience guaran-
teed freethinkers and atheists and nonconformists as much as to
Christians and Jews and every citizen?
"The court has upheld the glorious purpose of the First Amend-
ment. For this Protestants, Catholics, Jews and non-conformists alike
should be grateful. Prayer and religious exercises are not for a
Government to encourage or discourage; they' are for the church,
the home, the heart.-The Louisville Courier-ournal."
In his recent penetrating study of Church and State, Professor
'Kurland has suggested that it was no accident that the free practice
clause and the establishment clause were included in the same
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Amendment. Keeping the government out of religion and religion
out of the government was necessary to make individual religious
freedom a reality.86 He further thought that the two clauses should
be "read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading
of the equal protection than to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, i. e., they must be read to mean that religion
may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of govern-
mental action, whether that action be conferring of rights and pri-
vileges or the imposition of duties or obligations.r As one reviewer
put it, Kurland emphasizes that the separation and freedom aspects
of the first amendment are unitary and inseparable and that the
former forbids all that the latter does not require. Government may
accord a benefit or exemption to a religious institution or activity
only as a part of a larger classification not identified by religion and
not otherwise vulnerable to successful attack under the equal protec-
tion clause." 88
The author makes a plausible case that Black "came close" to
accepting this interpretation in the school bus case. It is true that
the Justice did "read together" the two clauses. But he seemed to
regard the "free practice" provisions as a limitation on the "establish-
ment" prohibition rather than the latter as a guarantee of the former.
Thus, he wrote: "New Jersey cannot consistently with the 'establish-
ment of religion' clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised
funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and
faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the
amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens
in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot
exclude individual Catholics*' or the members of any other faith,
because of their faith or Ick of it, from receiving the benefits of
public welfare legislation. ***We must be careful, in protecting the
citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure
that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending
its general state law benefits to all its citizens without regard to
their religious belief." 89
86 Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4
(1962). Also published as a book, supra, note 30.
87 Ibid., 5.
88 Pfeffer, Book Review, 15 Stan. L Rev. 389, 400 (1963).
89 330 U. S. 1. 16.
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The complexity of the two religious provisions of the Amend-
ment thus appears from the fact that although they may complement
each other, they also quite clearly protect different interests. As
Justice Black pointed out in the case of the New York school prayer,
"Although these two clauses may in certain instances overlap, they
forbid two quite different kinds of governmental encroachment upon
religious freedom." 90 The Sunday law cases are in point here. A
recent case involved a Maryland law under which several employees
of a discount house were prosecuted for selling a few trifling articles
on Sunday. They defended on the grounds that the statute violated
both clauses. The Supreme Court held that they had no standing to
raise the question of individual religious freedom. They were cer-
tainly not practicing religion by selling toys on Sunday. They could,
however, raise the establishment issue. A divided Court thereupon
found a justification for the law as one of rest and relaxation rather
than one, the operative effect of which was "to use the State's
coercive power to aid religion." 91 Nor is the result different if the
complainant is an Orthodox Jewish merchant, placed at an economic
disadvantage in that he has but five days, as against his competitor's
six in which to do business. It offends neither the establishment nor
the free practice clause. It merely makes his religious practice "more
expensive." 9 This is an "indirect burden" which the Court thought
didn't count "unless the state may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden." 93 It might have been suggested
that the day of rest, relaxation and family get-together-ness could as
well have been legislatively designated as say, Wednesday rather
than, as in Massachusetts, the "Lords Day," and thus impose no
burden on any known religious group.
Justices Brennan and Stewart dissented from the decision as
to the free practice clause but concurred as to the establishment
clause. The effect of these laws, wrote Brennan, is that no one may
at one and the same time be an Orthodox Jew and compete ef-
fectively with his Sunday-observing fellow tradesmen. "This clog,"
he continued, "upon the exercise of religion, this state-imposed burden
on Orthodox Judaism, has exactly the same economic effect as a tax
90 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U. S. 421, 430 (1962).
91 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 453 (1961).
92 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 605 (1961).
93 Ibid., 607.
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'levied upon the sale of religious literature." 9 And as put by Justice
Stewart, "Pennsylvania has passed a law which compels an Orthodox
Jew to choose between his religious faith and his economic survival.
That is a cruel choice." A choice, he thought, which "no state can
-constitutionally demand." Stewart felt strongly about it. For him, it
was not "something that can be swept under the rug and forgotten
in the interest of enforced Sunday togetherness."
In 1956, a study made at the University of Chicago disclosed
that twelve states and the District of Columbia have laws requiring
Bible reading in the public schools; ten states do not permit it,
while twenty-six states permit it by statute or judicial decision.95
Professor Dierenfield in his 1962 study of religion in the public
:schools, found, for the country as a whole, 41.74% of the public
school systems in the United States conduct Bible reading. The dis-
tribution by region was as follows: the East, mostly New York and
New England, 67.56%; South, including the eastern seaboard,
76.84%; Midwest, 18.26%; West, 11.03%. Home room 'devotional
,services were held in most schools in the East (68.33%) and South
(60.53%), but in relatively few in the Midwest (6.40%) and West
(2.41%).
In the New York prayer dispute, the "Regents prayer" re-
presented an attempt to provide a "non-sectarian" prayer. "Almighty
God, we acknowledge our dependence on Thee and we beg Thy bles-
sings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country." Theologi-
-cally, it was probably as good as any such prayer could be so far as
it concerned Catholics, Protestants, Jews and perhaps some other
faiths. The effect on non-believers need not be considered here.
In any event, however, "non-sectarian" the Regents prayer might
-have been, it is clear that there is still no such thing as non-sectarian
hible. Protestants use the King James version or the new Stand-
ard Revision based on it and the Catholics have the Douay version. 6
'Scholars of both faiths are coming closer to agreement on a tran-
'slation but have as yet not attained it. The Jews, of course, re-
-cognize only the Old Testament and most congregations use the
Jewish Publication Society's version. It is undoubtedly true that
94 Ibid., 613.
95 Conway, Religion and Public Education in the -States, International
Journal of Religious Education (March, 1956).
96 Dirnfield, Religion in American Public Schools, Chs. III, IV 1962.
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substantially all public schools which have bible reading exercises
use a Protestant version thereof.
On June 17, 1963, the Supreme Court banded down its decision
in two Bible reading cases, holding laws of both Pennsylvania and
Maryland unconstitutional as in conflict with the "establishment"
clause of the First Amendment.97 Only Justice Stewart dissented.
The Pennsylvania law required at least ten verses from the Bible
to be read, without comment, at the opening of each public school
on each school day. Provision was made for the teacher to excuse
any student from attending such reading on written request from
his parents. The Maryland case arose under a rule adpoted by the
School Board of Baltimore pursuant to a state statute which provided
for opening school- exercises at which a chapter from the Bible
should be read without comment and/or the "use of the Lord's
Prayer." Justice Clark, writing for the Court declared that the Court
had "rejected unequivocally the contention that the establishment
clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over
another." This would appear to be a blow at Professor Kurland's
thesis, plausible as it is, that the establishment and free exercise
clauses together merely forbid discrimination among faiths. Clark
quoted Rutledge's dissent in Everson that the Constitution does not
deny "the value or the necessity for religious training, teaching or
observance. Rather it secures their free exercise. But to that end it
does deny that the state can undertake or sustain them in any
form or degree. For this reason the sphere of religious activity,
as distinguished from the secular intellectual liberties, has been
given the two-fold protection and, as the state cannot forbid, neither
can it perform or aid in performing the religious function." 9
Justice Clark also relied upon a 1961 case in which the Court
held that a state may not constitutionally require an applicant for a
commission of Notary Public to swear or affirm his belief in God.
"Neither the state nor the Federal Government can constitutionally
force a person 'to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. Neither
can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all
religious as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
97 School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 83 Sp. Ct.
1560 (1963).
98 Ibid., 1569.
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based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions
founded on differente beliefs."
The test for constitutionality in this troubled area, Justice Clark
thought, was to inquire of the purpose and primary effect of the law.
To conform to the establishment clause there must be a secular
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor
inhibits religion. He denied that the exclusion of the exercises in-
volved in these cases amounted to the establishment of a "religion
of secularism." There was no hostility toward religion involved.
There was no preference or advantage or aid to those who believe
in no religion over believers, and he denied that the concept of
"neutrality" which denies to the state the power to require religious
exercises even with the consent of the majority, interferes with the
majorities right freely to practice their religion. The majority has
no right to the use of governmental machinery to practice its re-
ligious beliefs.99
Justice Brennan concurred-in forty pages. "The importance
of the issue," he wrote, "and the deep conviction with which views
on both sides are held seem to me to justify detailing at some length
my reasons for joining the Court's judgmoent and opinion." Like all
the other Justices, he attempted to interpret the "establishment"
clause and the "free exercise" clause as reflecting a single policy
with respect to the relations between the state, the religious esthblish-
ments and the individual. He noted the difference between the power
of government to regulate or prohibit conduct motivated by religious
motives such as the Mormon cases and the case of Jehovah's Witnesses
violating the Massachusetts child labor on the one hand, and the
power to compel behavior offensive to religious principles. He ex-
plained the case where students at a state university were required
to participate in military training on the grounds that they were not
compelled to attend a state university. If they chose to do so, they
could be required to conform to a program reflecting a legitimate
governmental interest. 10 The second flag salute case was a good
example of limitations on the power to coerce conduct against re-
ligious principles. The distinction between the two cases, Justice-
Brennan thought, was important. The one dealt with the voluntary
9? Ibid., 1573.
100 Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U. S. 246
(1934).
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attendance at college of young adults, the other involved compelled
attendance of young children at elementary and secondary schools.
The distinction warranted a "difference in constitutional results."
Brennan carefully reviewed the history of Bible reading and
prayers in the schools, public and private, from early colonial times
including cases under state statutes and constitutions before the
ruling that the First Amendment was applicable to the states via
the Fourteenth. The conclusion which he reached-and could hardly
escape reaching--was that these exercises had always been designed
to be and are still intended as religious. Although there may, as
claimed, be collateral secular benefits, educational and moral, they
are insufficient to take the practices out of* the prohibition of the
establishment clause. Somewhat inconsistent, perhaps, with his 'dig-
cussion of the distinction between prohibition and compulsion of
conduct contrary to religious belief, he brished aside the argument
that provision for excusing offended pupils absolved the religious
exercises from unconstitutional contamination. It had no relevance
to the. establishment question since the practices were religious in
character, designed to achieve religious aims through use of public
school facilities during school hours. Presumably the vice would, still
be present if the parents of every pupil had requested in writing the
reading of a specific chapter and the recitation of a particular
prayer.
The Justice finally met the "foot-in-the-door" argument that the
invalidation of the practices in these cases would compel the Court
to rule out "every vestige, however, slight, of cooperation or accom-
modation between religion and government." It would require noth-
ing of the kind. Because religious exercises in the public schools are
forbidden does not mean that the national anthem must be expurgated
and the legend removed from the silver dollar. "The line we must
draw" wrote the Justice, "between the permissible and the impermis-
sible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the
understanding of the Founding Fathers.'.' Justice Brennan then sought
to formulate a generalization which deserves careful thought and.
consideration whenever the establishment clause is under discussion.
Forbidden by that clause are "those involvements of religious with
secular institutions which (a) serve the essentially religious activities
of religious institutions; (b) employ the organs of governmeiit for
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essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious means
to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice."
Justices Goldberg and Harlan in a concurring opinion written
by the former, also iere at pains to emphasize the point that the
decision does not mean that "all incidents of government which
import of the religious are therefore and without more banned by
the strictures of the Establishment Clause." They even went so far
as to predict that the Court would recognize the propriety of provid-
ing military chaplains and of "teaching about religion, as distinguish-
ed from the teaching of religion, in the public schools."
Justice Stewart dissented. He did not think the records in these
cases furnished enough information to warrant decision on the merits
of the constitutional issue. To him, the vital point was coercion,
direct or indirect, by rule, regulation or administration. He would
remand the cases for further hearing.
All in all, the opinions of the Justices in their recognition of
religion, as a part of American life, should tend to reassure the
citizens that, as James Reston expressed it in the Times, "the country
is not going to hell with the blessing of the Supreme Court." 10A
The Times in its lead editorial after the Regents' prayer case,10 2
after pointing out what the Court did not decide observed that
"What Justice Black and six other members of the Court did object
to was that the State of New York, in formulating and using a
school prayer, took a position on a religious matter." This, it may be
said, is precisely what the Court did in the Lord's Prayer and Bible-
reading cases. The states of Pennsylvania and Maryland had taken a
position on a religious matter. Even though joining in the prayer
or even listening to it was voluntary, it can hardly be denied that
the state takes a position as much so as when it includes a course of
study in the curriculum, even though it is elective.
On the last day of the October 1962 term, on June 17th, the
Court decided its latest case under the religious clauses of the First
Amendment. The state of South Carolina had refused unemployment
compensation to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused, from re-
ligious convictions to work on Saturday which, for her, was the
Sabbath. She was not "available" for work within the state law.10
10, New York Times, June 19, 1963.
102 Sunday, July 1, 1962.
103 Sherbert V. Verner, 83 Sp. Ct. 1790 (1963).
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Justice Brennan, in the majority opinion, held that the state law
clearly imposed a burden on the free exercise of the woman's re-
ligion. Religious practices can be impaired directly, as by criminal
sanctions and indirectly as in this case. A person in this worker's
position must chose between adherence to her religious beliefs and
position must chose between adherence to her religious beliefs and
forfeiting the benefits to which she otherwise was entitled or com-
mitting what her religious faith regarded as a sin. The Justice reject-
ed the claimed distinction between a "privilege" and a "right" as
irrelevant to the issue inasmuch as denial of either could offend the
free practice provision. Nor could he find any overriding state in-
terest to mitigate the vice of the law. He rejected the State's argu-
ment that a different ruling would open the door to fraudulent claims
by unscrupulous claimants on the ground, not particularly convincing,
that there was nothing in the record of the particular case to suggest
fraud. It is generally recognized that fraud, involving as it does, a
state of mind, is frequently difficult to prove.
The lack of a compelling state interest was thought to distinguish
this case from the Sunday closing cases in which the Court had
found "a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest
for all workers." That purely secular objective could be achieved only
by declaring Sunday to be a day of rest. To exempt "Sabbatarians"
would be administratively inexpedient. The Justice insisted that the
present case involved the application of a principle announced fifteen
years ago in the New Jersey school bus case. No state may constitu-
tionally "exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohamedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or members
of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving
the benefits of public welfare legislation." 04 (Emphasis in original).
Justice Douglas wrote a concurring opinion. He first called at-
tention to the scruples of some of the well-known religious faiths.
The Moslams must go to a mosque on Friday and pray five times
each day. The scruples of the Sikh require him to carry a real or
symbolic sword. The Jehovah's Witness must be a proselyter. The
Quaker must refrain from swearing, although he may affirm. The
scruples of the Buddist requiere that he not eat flesh or fish. Douglas
referred to the cases upholding the Sunday closing laws which held
104 Ibid., 1797.
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that a majority of the community Could impose their particular
scruples on a minority whose religious scruples were thereby of-
fended-cases in which the Justice had dissented. "That ruling of
the Court," he wrote, "travels part of the distance that South Carolina
asks us to go now. She asks us to hold that when it comes to a day
of rest a Sabbatarian must conform with the scruples of the majority
in order to obtain unemployment benefits." He then went on to
write:
"The result turns not on the degree of injury, which may indeed
be nonexistent by ordinary standards. The harm is the interference
with the individual's scruples or conscience-an important area of
privacy which the First Amendment fences off from government.
The interference here is as plain as it is in Sov'iet Russia, where a
churchgoer is given a second-class citizenship, resulting in harm
though perhaps not in measurable damages.
"This case is resolvable not in terms of what an individual can
demand of government, but solely in terms of what government may
not do to an individual in violation of his religious scruples. The
fact that government cannot exact from me a surrender of one iota
of my religious scruples does not, of course, mean that I can demand
of government a sum of money, the better to exercise them. For the
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government
cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can
exact from the government." 105
Justice Stewart also concurred in the result of the case but took
occasion to expound his views of the religious clauses and his dis-
satisfaction with the Court's disposition of many of the cases arising
thereunder. He had dissented in the decision that the Sunday blue
laws did not interfere with the free practice of religion. He insisted
that the decision in this case substantially overruled those cases.
The "burden" on religious practices for Jewish merchants was much
greater than that involved in denial of compensation for twenty-two
weeks at most. The blue laws carried criminal penalties but the
economic hardship was far worse. Justice Brennan in the case of an
Orthodox Jewish storekeeper had observed that if he could not stay
open on Sunday, he would lose his capital investment.1 6
105 Ibid., 1798.
106 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 611 (1961).
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But Stewart raised a far more important question. He declared
that the result in this case, which he approved, was in collision with
the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause. It was "aid"
or "support" for a religion. "South Carolina," he wrote, "would
deny unemployment benefits to a mother unavailable for work on
Saturday because she could not get a babysitter (citing a South Caro-
lina case). Thus, we do not have before us a situation where a state
provides unemployment compensation generally, and singles out for
disqualification only those persons who are unavailable for work on
religious grounds. This is not, in short, a scheme which operates so
as to discriminate against religion as such. But the Court never-
theless holds that the state must prefer a religious over a secular
ground for being unavailable for work-that state finantial support
of the appellant's religion is constitutionally required to carry out
'the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious
diferences...'" 107 The Court, Stewart thought, was under a duty
to face up to the dilemma created by the conflict between the free
practice clause and the establishment clause, as interpreted in the
school bus, the prayer and the blue-law cases.
Justice Brennan also dealt with the problem of conflict between
the two clauses in the Bible-reading cases, decided on the same day
as the South Carolina unemployment compensation cases. He refer-
red to government employment of chaplains in prisons and the armed
services only to distinguish them from the scripture-reading and
prayer cases on the ground that the prison inmates and service
personnel are required to be where they are and, unless the govern-
ment made provision therefor, would be denied devotional opportu-
nities of their choice. He thought, too, that the fact that the school
cases involved young children was especially important. The 'con-
flict' between the two religious clauses did not bother Justice Brei-
nan as much as they did Justice Stewart. In fact, his opinion in the
Bible-reading case was a long and labored effort to reconcile previous
cases under the religious clauses.
It is, of course, not surprising that the Justices differ on the
application of principles to which all subscribe. This is of the essence
of judicial interpretation of the many generalities in the Constitution.
"Due process of law," "unreasonable searches and seizures," "cruel
-,107 .83 Sp. Ct. 1790, 1800.
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or unusual punishment," "with respect to the establishment of re-
ligion." As Professor Kurland says anyone maintaining that the
answer in a particular case is clear is either "deluded or delud-
ing." 108
There is, indeed, ambiguity and conflict in the historical evidence
as to the position Jefferson took or would take on certain specific
questions. There is, for example, his Report, as Rector, to the Pre-
sident and Directors of the Literary Fund at the University of
Virginia, quoted by Justice Reed in his dissent in the Illinois release
time case. There were several items of business reported including
resolutions pertaining to the building of a library, ratification of
certain accounts of the bursar and other financial matters. The
report then called attention to the fact that "the want of instruction
in the various creeds of religious faith existing among our citizens
presents'** a chasm in a general institution of the useful sciences."
He then continued as follows: "A remedy, however, has been sug-
gested of promising aspect, which, while it excludes the public au-
thorities -from the domain of religious freedom, will give to the
sectarian schools of divinity the full benefit the public provisions
made for instruction in the other branches of science." He then
continued: "It has, therefore, been in contemplation, and suggested
'by some pious individuals, who perceive the advantages of associat-
ing other studies with those of religion, to establish their religious
schools on the confines of the University, so as to give to their
students ready and convenient access and attendance on the scientific
lectures of the University.'** But always understanding that these
schools shall be independent of the University and of each other."
It seems that the suggestion was adopted by the University and
included in its statutes, presumably with Jefferson's approval, so
that the students would be "free, and expected to attend religious
worship at the establishment of their respective sects, in the morn-
ing, and in time to meet their school in the University at its stated
hour." 109 It should be added that Madison was a member of the
Board of Visitors which approved Jefferson's report.
Nevertheless, as Justice Brennan observed in his concurring
opinion in the Bible-reading cases, "It may be that Jefferson and
Madison would have held such exercises to be permissible.' But
108 29 U. Chi. L Rev. 1, 96 (1962).
109 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 414-418 (Memorial Edition, 1904).
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I doubt that their view, even if perfectly clear one way or the other,
would supply a dispositive answer to the question presented by these.
cases. A more fruitful inquiry'** is whether the practices here chal-
lenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply feared;.
whether, in short, they tend to promote that type of inter-dependence
between religion and state which the First Amendment was designed'
to prevent.*' A too literal quest for the advice of the Founding,
Fathers upon the issues of these cases seems to me futile and mis-
directed for several reasons: First, on our precise problem, the-
historical record is at least ambiguous, and statements can readily
be found to support either side of the proposition... Second, the
structure of American education has greatly changed since the First
Amendment was adopted... Third, our religious composition makes;
us a vastly more diverse people than our forefathers... Whatever
Jefferson or Madison would have thought of Bible reading or recitar
of the Lord's Prayer in what few public schools existed in their day,.
our use of the history of their time must limit itself to broad purposes,,
not specific practices." 110
Of the "two great drives" referred to by Justice Rutledge, it
may be that the firm stand taken by the Court and its near unanimity
in the Regents Prayer case and the Bible-reading cases have blocked
at least temporarily the religion-in-the-public-schools program. But the
same cannot be said for the campaign to obtain state aid for religious
institutions. Since Everson that program has flourished luxuriantly.
An opinion of the General Counsel of the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare in 1961 classified a long list of Government
activities and programs under which institutions with religious af-
filiations receive Federal funds through grants or loans. A few exam-
ples are the following.
School lunches, "nutritious midday meals to children attending
schools of high school grade and less"; special milk program for
"children in nonprofit schools of high school grade an under"; funds
under the National Defense Education Act to enable nonprofit institu-
tions of higher learning to make "low-interest loans to needy stud-
ents"; grants "to strengthen science, mathematics and modern foreign
language instruction in secondary schools;" testing students in pri-
vate elementary schools; training of secondary school counsellors;
110 83 Sp. Ct. 1560, 1578, 1579, 1581.
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grants for research in more effective utilization of Television, Radio
and Related Media; grants for research on mental diseases; grants
to Divinity Schools for instruction on mental health; research relat-
,ing to "social security matters"; the allocation of surplus property,
.personal and real, for educational and public health purposes "at a
,public benefit discount which can be as much as 100% of the ap-
praised fair value"; summer institutes for higher education in fields
relating to atomic energy; training of all types for the rehabilitation
of war veterans.
This side of the Wall appears to be crumbling away and may
,collapse utterly unless repairs are soon forthcoming.
